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Abstract
Establishing the existence and nature of changes in the conduct and transmission of
monetary policy is key in understanding the remarkable macroeconomic performance of the
US since the mid 1980s. This paper presents evidence on a phenomenon of disintermediation
occurring during the major recessions in the 1960s and 1970s, but absent ever since. Using
a novel data set, I show that disintermediation is closely linked to the existence of deposit
rate ceilings under regulation Q. In a monetary DSGE model that incorporates deposit
rate ceilings as occasionally binding constraints, the regulation alters the behavior of money
aggregates and exacerbates the drop in economic activity following a monetary tightening.
The results of a time-varying coefficient VAR lend support to the main theoretical predictions
of the model. In a counterfactual experiment, the presence of deposit rate ceilings explains
two thirds of the decline in output volatility since the early 1980s.
JEL classification: E3, E4, E5, G21, G28
Keywords: monetary policy, monetary transmission, banking, financial regulation
*Department of Economics, European University Institute, Via dei Roccettini 9, 50016 Firenze;
E-mail: karel.mertens@eui.eu
I would like to thank Giancarlo Corsetti, John Duca, Pontus Rendahl and Sanne Zwart for discussion and
suggestions.
1 Introduction
Output and inflation volatility in the US have dropped considerably since the early 1980s,
which suggests a fundamental change in the dynamics of the economy.1 So far, no consensus has
emerged on the fundamental causes of this Great Moderation. Many, such as Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (2000) and Cogley and Sargent (2001, 2005), focus on shifts in monetary policymaking,
arguing that the Federal Reserve has become more successful in fighting inflation and stabilizing
economic activity. Others, such as Bernanke and Mihov (1998) and Sims and Zha (2006), find
little evidence for a break in the conduct of monetary policy. The focus of this paper is on one
aspect of monetary policymaking for which structural change is a historical fact: Regulatory
deposit rate ceilings and their removal in the early 1980s.
After the banking collapse of the 1930s, US legislators imposed a regulatory structure on the
US banking sector aimed at restoring financial stability. The Banking Act of 1933 introduced
regulation Q of the Federal Reserve, prohibiting interest payments on demand deposits and
imposing interest rate ceilings on time and savings deposits at commercial banks. The purpose
of the regulation was to shelter banks from excessive competition, discourage risky investment
policies and prevent future bank failures. Most of the ceilings were phased out between 1980
and 1986.
This paper provides evidence, based on data constructed from historical Federal Reserve
releases, that binding deposit rate ceilings gave rise to a phenomenon of “disintermediation”:
Unable to raise deposit rates above the legal ceilings, banks could not compete effectively with
market instruments and failed to manage their liabilities in the same way as without binding
regulations. Disintermediation potentially has real effects if the resulting shortage of loanable
funds forces banks to cut back on lending to borrowers that rely on intermediated finance. In
1The evidence on the Great Moderation is discussed by Kim and Nelson (1999), as well as McConnell and
Perez-Quiros (2000) and Blanchard and Simon (2001).
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that case, regulation Q affects the monetary transmission mechanism and may have contributed
to business cycle volatility during the 1960s and 1970s. This hypothesis deserves attention,
since in contrast with the post-1980 years, every recession during this period is associated with
outflows in all deposit categories at US banks.
To formalize the argument, I construct a theoretical DSGE model that incorporates occa-
sionally binding interest rate ceiling constraints and solve it numerically. Attention is restricted
to monetary policy innovations in order to relate to the debate on changes in monetary policy
as an explanation for the Great Moderation. Comparing the impulse responses to an unantic-
ipated decrease in the money supply with and without a binding constraint, the model yields
several testable predictions: In the presence of a binding ceiling, the spread between market
interest rates and the ceiling widens; real deposit holdings display a disintermediation effect; the
liquidity effect of a monetary tightening is larger; the contraction in business lending is more
severe; inventories/sales ratios are lower; and finally, the output decline is more pronounced.
I confront the theoretical predictions with the data by estimating a structural VAR while
allowing for time-variation in the autoregressive coefficients. The empirical model captures the
nonlinearities of binding deposit rate ceilings by exploiting information contained in the spread
between market interest rates and the regulatory ceilings. In response to an identified positive
innovation in the Federal Funds rate, binding ceilings exacerbate the contraction in output.
Moreover, the response of the spread, the monetary aggregates and real lending are consistent
with the theoretical predictions. These findings lend support for a structural change in the
monetary transmission mechanism since the early 1980s that is due to the disappearance of
regulation-induced disintermediation effects. The results also imply a role for regulation Q in
shaping macroeconomic outcomes during the 1960s and 1970s in the US. A counterfactual ex-
periment, in which the effects of regulation Q are removed from the 1960s-1970s data, indicates
that two thirds of the reduction in output volatility can be explained by the effects of deposit
rate ceilings.
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The literature has produced several alternative explanations for the decline of output volatil-
ity in the US. According to the “good luck” hypothesis, the Great Moderation is mostly due to
reductions in the volatility of exogenous disturbances (see Stock and Watson (2002) and Ahmed,
Levin and Wilson (2004)). Another hypothesis, put forward by Kahn, McConnell and Perez-
Quiros (2002), is that improvements in inventory management and information technology are
responsible. However, Stock and Watson (2002) and Ramey and Vine (2005) question this point
of view on empirical grounds. Although acknowledged by Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Stock
and Watson (2002), the role of financial innovation and deregulation in the late 1970s and early
1980s has received relatively little attention. According to the general financial markets dereg-
ulation hypothesis, improved access to credit markets has enhanced the ability of consumers to
smooth income shocks and has lessened the sensitivity of business spending to fluctuations in
sales and cash flow. Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel (2006) provide empirical evidence in support
of this explanation. Some previous research has focussed on the impact of deposit rate ceil-
ings in this context. For instance, Duca (1996) and McCarthy and Peach (2002) argue that a
regulation-induced disintermediation effect of interest rate hikes leads to sharp contractions in
residential construction and housing sales. Duca (2005) also finds regulation-Q effects in the
market for consumer credit.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents evidence of the disinter-
mediation phenomenon during the 1960s and 1970s; Section 3 describes the monetary DSGE
model and its quantitative properties. Section 4 lays out the empirical strategy, and discusses
the estimated impulse responses and the counterfactual experiment. Section 5 concludes.
3
2 Disintermediation and Deposit Rate Ceilings
Regulation-induced disintermediation occurs when depository institutions experience drops in
deposit inflows because legal ceilings prevent the payment of the higher interest rates offered on
market instruments. This phenomenon was described by, for instance, Ruebling (1970) as well as
Cook (1978) and Gilbert and Lovati (1979). In this paper, I distinguish two major components
of the liability side of depository institutions’ balance sheets: Core deposits, consisting of all
checkable and savings deposits; and managed liabilities, which are defined as the sum of small
and large denomination time deposits, dollar-denominated deposits issued by foreign banks
(also known as eurodollar deposits), and security repurchase agreements. Core deposits have
traditionally been, and still are, quite interest-sensitive, with rising interest rates leading to
outflows as agents substitute towards higher yielding alternatives. By varying the rate of interest
offered on other types of deposits, banks can control the total deposit inflow and “manage”
their liabilities. To the extent that investors substitute towards these alternatives, banks are
able to maintain the pool of loanable funds. The larger the spread between rates on alternative
saving instruments and the rates offered by depository institutions, the bigger the opportunity
cost of holding deposits. If regulations constrain interest rates paid on managed liabilities,
banks, not being able to offer competitive yields, may fail to offset losses in core deposits. The
disintermediation effect occurs when, for these reasons, binding regulatory ceilings cause slowing
or negative growth in all deposit categories.
Figure 1 plots real growth of core deposits and managed liabilities at US depository institu-
tions from 1960 to 2005. From the late 1970s onwards, there is a negative correlation between
the two series, which suggests that banks have successfully counteracted losses in core deposits.
Before, however, the picture is quite different: Every NBER-dated recession is associated with
slowing or negative growth in both core deposits and managed liabilities. If this fact is to be ex-
plained by a regulation-induced disintermediation effect, it needs to be the case that the ceilings
constituted binding constraints at those instances. Note for example, that there is one early
episode (1966 and early 1967) of negative growth in core deposits during which banks were able
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to expand their use of managed liabilities.
To identify the periods in which regulation Q was binding, I constructed a monthly data set
from historical issues of the Federal Reserve’s Annual Statistical Digest.2 I refer the interested
reader to Appendix A for a more detailed background on regulatory adjustments and financial
market innovations that have influenced deposit rate regulation over time.
Core Deposits - Figure 2 plots real growth of core deposits against the difference between
the 3-month T-bill rate and the ceiling on savings deposits from 1960 until the removal in 1986.
The figure shows a stable negative relationship between the spread and deposit growth. It also
reveals how on each occasion up to 1983, a positive spread is associated with drops in core
deposit growth. In fact, every NBER-dated recession is associated with troughs in core deposit
growth and peaks in the ceiling spread. Finally, note that the large spike in core deposit growth
in 1983 is due to the nationwide authorization of a string of new transaction and savings deposit
instruments (including ATS, NOW, Super-NOW and MMDA accounts). The ceilings on core
deposits were lifted in March 1986.
Managed Liabilities - To assess the relevance of deposit rate ceilings on managed liabilities,
it is important to first have a look at their composition. Figure 3 depicts the components
of managed liabilities as a share of the total. Although steadily declining over time, small
denomination time deposits (STDs) have traditionally constituted the largest share of managed
liabilities. Because of the creation of large negotiable certificates of deposit (CD), by the mid
1960s, the share of large time deposits (LTDs) had risen from 10% to almost 40% of managed
liabilities. After 5 years of subsequent decline, 1970 marked a turning point, after which the
share of LTDs has remained relatively stable at about 25%, until recently climbing back up to
40%. The volumes of Eurodollar deposits and Repurchase Agreements have historically remained
relatively small compared to the volume of time deposits.
2The Annual Statistical Digest is published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and
documents ceiling adjustments on the various types of deposits. A monthly data set is available from the author.
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Although usually higher than those for savings deposits, maximum rates also applied to time
deposits. Figure 4 plots the real growth rate of small and large time deposits, together with the
spreads between the relevant market rates and the ceilings for various maturities. Real growth
in small term deposits, depicted in the left panel of Figure 4, was negative during 1960, when
the spread on all maturities was positive. A series of upward adjustments of the ceilings in
1962, 1963, 1964 and 1965 brought STD rates back in line with market rates. The revisions
initiated an expansion in STDs during the course of 1966 and early 1967. This counteracted
the contemporaneous drop in core deposits on which the ceilings were still binding. In contrast,
at the onset of the recessions in 1969-1970 and 1973-1975, market rates exceeding the ceilings
had brought about significant reductions in STD growth. The authorization of Money Market
Certificates and Small Saver Certificates in 1978 and 1979 explains why the growth in STDs
remained relatively stable while interest rates soared in the early 1980s (see Appendix A). In
September 1983, the ceilings on small time deposits were eliminated.
Real growth of LTDs, shown in the right panel of Figure 4, also displays evidence of dis-
intermediation effects. Major ceiling rates adjustments in the first half of the 1960s ensured
that banks could offer competitive rates as the market for LTDs expanded. However, positive
spreads towards the end of the 1960s caused a dramatic fall in the amount of LTDs outstanding,
also explaining the decline in their relative use, evident in Figure 3. The contraction in LTDs
outstanding even led to the removal of ceilings for certain smaller maturities in 1970. In 1973,
regulation-Q ceilings were lifted on all LTDs.
The analysis of bank liabilities and deposits rate ceilings leads to the following conclusions:
First, on multiple occasions, there have been contemporaneous contractions in core deposits and
managed liabilities growth during the 1960s and 1970s. In contrast, after the late 1970s, the
correlation between the growth rates of both deposit categories is consistently negative. Second,
the contractions in deposits coincide exactly with periods in which market rates exceeded the
deposit rate ceilings imposed under regulation Q, thus providing evidence for a regulation-
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induced disintermediation effect. Third, episodes in which disintermediation appears to have
taken place include the periods surrounding the 1960 and 1970 recessions. Also the 1973-1975
recession seems to have been associated with disintermediation, despite the earlier removal of
ceilings on large time deposits. Regulatory changes and innovations in banking explain why
the impact of the deposit rate ceilings was reduced towards the end of the 1970s, even though
regulation Q was not formally removed until the early 1980s.
3 Effects of Disintermediation: A Monetary DSGE Model
If the regulation-induced disintermediation observed in the data has forced banks to cut back on
lending to borrowers that depend on intermediated finance, it has potentially also exacerbated
the business cycle. This section develops a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model
in which interest rate regulations, incorporated as occasionally binding constraints, affect the
transmission of stochastic shocks primarily by affecting the availability of bank credit: Binding
ceilings reduce the demand for deposits and constrain the pool of loanable funds. I restrict
attention to monetary shocks to relate to the debate on changes in monetary policy as an expla-
nation for the Great Moderation. The model also incorporates inventory investment decisions,
because the availability of short-term credit directly affects firms’ optimal inventory response
to a monetary-induced drop in sales. Since most short-term business credit consists of bank
loans, the disintermediation effect could alter the sensitivity of inventory investment to cash
flow fluctuations and the ability of firms to smooth production. Therefore, disintermediation
could also be relevant for the inventory explanation of the Great Moderation.
There are several additional reasons to narrow the discussion to the monetary transmission
mechanism: First, disintermediation occurs when nominal market interest rates exceed the
deposit rate ceilings. The monetary authority exerts control over nominal rates by varying the
supply of base money. So regulation-Q effects are either induced by the systematic response
of policy to non-monetary shocks or otherwise by unexpected shifts in monetary policy itself.
However, the debate on the stability of the systematic conduct of monetary policy has not yet
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been settled. Narrowing attention to money shocks permits the common practice of modelling
money as an exogenous stochastic process and mitigates the need of taking a stance on time
variation in monetary policy rules. Second, the most direct consequence of the disintermediation
effect for the real economy operates through the availability of loanable funds, a channel of
transmission that is traditionally associated with monetary policy. Third, despite a wide range
of methodologies, the empirical literature on monetary transmission has reached considerable
agreement about the qualitative effects of monetary policy shocks on the main macroeconomic
variables. Accordance with this consensus imposes a great deal of discipline on both the theory
and the empirical testing procedures and therefore adds to the plausibility of the results.
3.1 A Monetary DSGE Model of Deposit Rate Ceilings
The model is a standard money-in-the-utility-function model, with a few twists. Apart from
the regulation-Q price controls and the possibility of inventory investment, the model features
a finance constraint: Firms must finance working capital expenses by taking out a bank loan.
This assumption is an often-used short-cut to creating dependency on the availability of loanable
funds in monetary models, see for instance Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) or Fuerst (1992).
Furthermore, I assume that prices are set before the realization of the current shock. This
price-setting friction allows for more realistic effects of monetary shocks on interest rates and
real variables. The economy contains a household sector, a firm sector, a banking sector and a
government and the only source of uncertainty is a shock to the money supply.
The Household - The economy is inhabited by an infinitely-lived representative household
that starts every period t = 0, ...,∞ with the economy’s entire last period money stock Mt.
The household decides to deposit an amount Mt − Qt in a bank and keep Qt as nominal cash
balances. Deposits earn a gross nominal deposit rate Rt.
The specification of household preferences is identical to Christiano and Eichenbaum (2005).
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Lifetime utility is
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
log(ct)− Ψ2 h
2
t +
Ω
1− 1/φ
(
Qt
Pt
)1− 1
φ
]
, (1)
where E0 is the time 0 conditional expectation operator; ct is the period t value of a consumption
index to be defined below; ht is hours worked in period t; and Pt is the period t consumption-
based money price index. The parameters of the utility function are the discount factor, 1 >
β > 0; the time allocation parameter, Ψ > 0; the utility weight of real cash balances, Ω > 0;
and the interest rate elasticity of the demand for cash, φ > 0.
There is a continuum of differentiated final consumption goods, indexed by j ∈ (0, 1), that enter
the household utility function through the index ct, given by
ct =
∫ 1
0
[(
njt
nt
) ξ
²
s
²−1
²
jt
] ²
²−1
dj .
Here, sjt is the amount of good j purchased by the household for consumption in period t,
whereas njt denotes the total stock of good j that is available for sale in period t. This specifica-
tion of the consumption index implies that, at a given price, finished goods inventories facilitate
sales. This modelling approach is followed by, for instance, Bils and Kahn (2000) and is also
related to models that incorporate inventories as a factor of production, such as Kydland and
Prescott (1982) and Christiano (1988). Note that here, following Jung and Yun (2006), the stock
of good j available in stores generates higher utility for the household only to the extent it is
higher than the economy-wide average level nt =
∫ 1
0 njtdj. The parameters of the consumption
goods index ct are the elasticity of demand with respect to stock available for sales, ξ > 0; and
the price elasticity of demand for good j, ² > 1.
Letting Pjt denote the price of good j, intratemporal cost minimization implies the following
demand function for the j-th good:
sjt =
(
njt
nt
)ξ (Pjt
Pt
)−²
ct , (2)
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where the utility-based price index Pt is given by
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
(
njt
nt
)ξ
Pjt
1−²
) 1
1−²
.
Household assets evolve according to
Mt+1 = Rt(Mt −Qt) +Dt +Wtht +Qt − Ptct . (3)
The first term on the right hand side, Rt(Mt −Qt), denotes total interest earnings on deposits
held with the banks. Without loss of generality, asset markets are not modelled explicitly andDt
simply represents combined period t dividend payments from the household and banking sector.
The third term, Wtht is total labor earnings, where Wt is the period t nominal wage. Finally,
Qt are cash balances and Ptct is total consumption expenditure. The intertemporal decision
problem of the household consists of choosing sequences of cash holdings, consumption levels
and labor effort, contingent on the history of realizations of the shock, in order to maximize
lifetime utility as defined in (1), subject to the constraint defined in (3).
The Firms - Each final consumption good j ∈ (0, 1) is produced by a monopolistic firm
using labor as the only input. The technology for period t production for each firm j is given by
yjt =
 h
α
jt − θ if hαjt ≥ θ
0 otherwise
, (4)
where θ > 0 is a fixed cost of production and 1 > α > 0 and hjt is labor input by firm j. There
is no entry or exit in the market for good j. Each firm’s stock of goods available for sale in
period t is
njt = njt−1 − sjt−1 + yjt , (5)
where sjt−1 are period t− 1 sales of good j.
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It is assumed that workers must be paid in advance and that firms must borrow the wage bill
by lending Ljt from a bank. As a result, each firm j faces a financing constraint Wthjt ≤ Ljt.
Loans are repaid at the end of the period at the gross interest rate rt. Firms set prices in period
t before the current realization of the shock and see Vt, the marginal value of one unit of cash to
the household in period t, as exogenous. Noting that, as long as rt > 1, the financing constraint
holds with equality, the objective of each firm j is to choose sequences of prices and production
levels contingent on the realization of uncertainty in order to maximize
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtVt [Pjtsjt − rtWthjt] ,
taking into account the demand function for its differentiated final consumption good, given by
(2), and subject to (4) and (5).
The Banks - The representative bank receives deposits Mt −Qt and receives Xt as a cash
injection from the government. Hence, bank lending is restricted by the availability of funds as
follows
Lt ≤Mt −Qt +Xt .
The market for business loans is competitive and as long as rt ≥ Rt > 1, the intermediary lends
all the available funds to the firms. Government regulation stipulates the following restriction
on interest rates paid on deposits:
Rt ≤ Rq ,
where Rq > 1 is an exogenous deposit rate ceiling. This inequality captures regulation Q in a
simple and straightforward manner. The banks’ net cash position at the end of each period t is
distributed as dividends to the household, the ultimate owner of the banks. Entry and exit in
the banking sector is ruled out.
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The Government - The money stock evolves according to Mt+1 = Mt + Xt. Define
µt ≡Mt+1/Mt as the growth rate of money in period t, which evolves according to the univariate
stochastic process
ln(µt) = (1− ρ) ln(µ) + ρ ln(µt−1) + χt , (6)
where µ > 1 is the average gross growth rate of the money stock, 1 > ρ > 0 measures the
persistence and χt is a normal i.i.d. random variable with mean zero and variance σ2 > 0.
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1998) provide arguments in favor of this simple represen-
tation of monetary policy for evaluating the effect of monetary shocks in theoretical models.
Market Clearing and Equilibrium - An equilibrium is a set of sequences of prices and
quantities such that all agents maximize their objective functions and goods, labor and asset
markets clear. Appendix B provides a more detailed equilibrium definition.
Note that loan market clearing implies that
Wtht =Mt+1 −Qt . (7)
Competition in the market for loans ensures that Rt = rt as long as the regulation Q-constraint
is not binding. Else, in the case where the interest rate constraint binds, it must be the case
that rt > Rt = Rq.
3.2 Parametrization and Numerical Solution Methodology
Parametrization - Following standard practice, I choose parameter values to obtain certain
properties of the steady state of a non-stochastic version of the model. All the values used for
generating the results are summarized in Table 1. The time period in the model corresponds
to one quarter. The parameters can be partitioned into three groups. The first group contains
the household’s preference parameters, namely β, Ψ, Ω, φ, ² and ξ. The discount factor is
β = 1.03−0.25, implying an annualized real interest rate of 3% in the non-stochastic steady
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state. The value for the time allocation parameter Ψ normalizes the steady-state value of
hours worked h to unity. The value for the utility weight Ω yields a ratio of cash balances to
the total money stock Q/M equal to 0.3. The interest rate elasticity of money demand φ is
0.24. Obtaining reliable estimates for this parameter is difficult because of structural changes
in financial markets. I take the value estimated by Teles and Zhou (2005), who use a relatively
stable monetary aggregate, MZM, and a more accurate measure of the opportunity cost. The
value of 0.24 is higher than the one estimated by Christiano and Eichenbaum (2005) but lower
than those obtained by Lucas (1988) and Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000). Next, the value
of the price elasticity of demand ² yields a steady state non-competitive markup of 20% (see
Rotemberg and Woodford (1995)). Finally, the value for ξ matches the average inventories/sales
ratio in manufacturing and trade in US postwar data. The second group contains the technology
parameters, θ and α. The choice of α = 0.64 corresponds to the labor income share in the data
and the fixed cost θ is set to ensure that firms make zero excess profits in the non-stochastic
steady state. The third group are the parameters governing the money growth process. I borrow
these values from Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992): The average quarterly gross growth rate
is µ = 1.012, the autoregressive parameter ρ is 0.3 and the standard deviation of the monetary
shock is σ = 0.012.
Numerical Solution Methodology - I compute the model solution by solving the system
of Euler equations describing the equilibrium behavior of the various macroeconomic variables,
which is given in Appendix B. The numerical method is based on time iteration, as described by
Coleman (1990). The main advantages of the procedure are its straightforward application to
non-Pareto optimal economies and the fact that convergence is usually achieved. Time iteration
also does not rely on discretization of the state space, but instead requires interpolation tech-
niques that preserve the continuous nature of the state space. In addition, as showed by Rendahl
(2006), time iteration is relatively easily to implement in the presence of inequality constraints.3
However, time iteration is generally slow. Therefore the iterative scheme is augmented by the
3In fact, Rendahl (2006) proves numerical convergence for the case of Pareto optimal economies.
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application of the method of endogenous gridpoints, developed by Carrol (2006). This method
reduces the number of nonlinear equations that need to be solved numerically in every iteration.
The model features two endogenous state variables, nt and pt, and one exogenous state χt. All
functions are approximated by a linear interpolation scheme based on a grid of the state space.
The grid contains 20 nodes for both endogenous state variables, and 9 nodes for the shock. Tak-
ing expectations requires integration over the continuous state space. The integrals with respect
to the normal density are approximated using Gauss-Hermite quadrature with 10 quadrature
nodes (see Judd (1998)).
3.3 Quantitative Properties of the Model
Figure 5 plots the response of some of the main variables to a one-standard-deviation (1.2%)
unexpected decrease in the money growth rate in period t = 1. The solid line represents the
model without deposit rate ceiling (Rq is set arbitrarily high), the striped line represents the
model with a ceiling Rq of 1.02. The response of the net interest rate rt − 1, inflation Pt/Pt−1
and the interest rate-ceiling spread rt − Rq are in levels, whereas those for production yt, the
inventories/sales ratio (nt−ct)/ct, real lending Lt/Pt, real cash balances Qt/Pt and real deposits
(Mt−Qt)/Pt are all in percentage deviations from the state prior to the shock. This initial state,
at t = 0, is the one to which the economy converges when the value of the exogenous shock
is set to χt = 0 for an arbitrarily long period. Note that this state does not correspond to
the steady state of the non-stochastic version of the model. For instance, in the absence of a
ceiling on the deposit rate, r0 = R0 = 1.0192 is slightly below its non-stochastic steady-state
level of µ/β = 1.0195 because of Jensen’s inequality. When a ceiling of Rq = 1.02 is imposed,
the market interest rate is 1.0202, which is higher than µ/β. This is because, in those states
of the world where the ceiling is binding, a higher loan rate rt is required to clear the market
for loanable funds, as the ceiling decreases the opportunity cost of holding cash and lowers the
demand for deposits. For the consumption Euler equation to hold, interest rates also need to
be higher in states of the world where the ceiling is not binding. The fact that interest rates
14
increase on average with regulation Q is interesting in itself, since one of the motivations during
the 1960s and 1970s to keep the ceilings below the market interest rates was to lower loan rates
charged by banks. In the current setting, this reasoning breaks down. Because of the finance
constraint, the higher interest rates raise the marginal cost of hiring labor and therefore lower
output and consumption relative to the regulation-free model. Note that for Rq = 1.02, the
ceiling is binding in the initial state. Hence, in simulations, deposit rates are at the ceiling more
often than not, which is the case in 1960s and 1970s data.
In response to a negative money growth shock, both models display a “liquidity effect”, i.e.
market interest rates rise after a money tightening. To see why, write the real supply of loanable
funds in the economy as
Lst
Pt
=
Xt
Pt
+
(
Mt
Pt
−
(
Rt − 1
Ωct
)−φ)
. (8)
Loanable funds come from two sources: The first term in equation (8) represents the exogenous
injections by the government, the second term reflects the endogenous supply of deposits by the
households derived from the household’s first order condition with respect to cash balances. The
demand for deposits depends positively on the deposit rate Rt and negatively on consumption
through the equalization of the marginal utilities of holding cash and consuming. Using the
firms’ first order condition for labor, loan demand can be written as
Ld
Pt
= α
MCt
Pt
yt + θ
rt
. (9)
Loan demand depends negatively on the cost of borrowing rt and the markup Pt/MCt and
positively on production yt, all of which determine the size of the real wage bill in equilibrium.
The monetary shock leads to a leftward shift of the loan supply curve through a decrease in Xt.
Because prices do not adjust immediately, clearing of the loan market is achieved by a reduction
in demand through increases in rt and MCt/Pt and a decrease in yt. In the regulation-free
model, an endogenous reaction of deposit demand through an increase in Rt and a decrease in
ct counteracts the decrease in the supply of funds. The two lower right panels of Figure 5 show
15
how households substitute out of cash balances and into interest-bearing deposits. Despite this
shift into deposits, the net effect for the loan market is a decrease in Lt/Pt and an increase in the
borrowing cost rt. In the model with a binding regulation-Q constraint, there is no first order
effect on deposit demand through an increase in Rt. The cash position of the household changes
only through the decrease in ct. This is the model equivalent of the disintermediation effect of
deposit rate ceilings. As a result, a larger part of the adjustment must occur through increases
in rt and MCt/Pt and the decrease in yt. The immediate consequence of disintermediation is
thus to amplify the liquidity effect of a monetary contraction.
In both models, a monetary tightening leads to a fall in hours worked and output: On the
one hand, higher borrowing costs increase the marginal cost of hiring labor, which leads to
a leftward shift of the labor demand curve; On the other hand, the labor supply curve shifts
rightward because of a drop in consumption. Both effects contribute to a decline of the real
wage Wt/Pt, and because prices do not react in the period of the shock, necessarily also of the
nominal wageWt. Nevertheless, the net result is a decline in ht, which implies that the marginal
cost of hiring labor, RtWt/MCt has risen. Because borrowing costs rise more with a binding
regulation-Q ceiling, the decline in output is much more pronounced than for the regulation-free
model.
To understand the response of inventories, it useful to consider the firms’ first order condition
for inventory investment, which in a symmetric equilibrium leads to the following relation:
Ptξ
st
nt
+ βEt
[
Vt+1
Vt
MCt+1
](
1− ξ st
nt
)
=MCt . (10)
Adding an extra unit to the stock of goods available for sale is associated with a marginal
cost MCt, and yields an increase in sales of ξst/nt, valued at Pt. To the extent the extra
unit adds to inventories and is not sold, production is shifted from t + 1 to t, saving the firm
the present discounted value of tomorrow’s marginal production cost MCt+1. For notational
ease, let zt = MCt/Pt denote the inverse of the markup charged over marginal cost and zet =
βEt [zt+1Pt+1Vt+1/Pt/Vt] the expected discounted value of next period’s inverse markup. Using
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(10), the inventories/sales ratio can be written as
it
ct
≡ nt − ct
ct
= ξ
(
1− zet
zt − zet
)
− 1 . (11)
Note that the inventories/sales ratio is increasing in today’s markup, and decreasing in the
expected markup tomorrow. The reason is that, since the return to inventory investment is
largely the ability to boost current sales, firms wish to build up the stock of goods available for
sale at times when profit margins are high. The marginal cost of producing one additional good
is
MCt =
rtWt
α
(yt + θ)
1−α
α . (12)
The drop in yt and Wt contributes to a decrease in MCt whereas the increase in rt tends to
increase MCt. The net effect in both models, however, is a decrease in marginal cost and, since
prices are sticky, and increase in Pt/MCt. In the next period, prices adjust and there is a drop
in the markup. The countercyclical reaction of today’s markup and the lower markup tomorrow
are the reason why firms wish to increase the inventories/sales ratio, which is achieved both
through a drop in ct and an increase in the stock of inventories. Because borrowing costs rise
more in the model with regulation Q, the increase in the profit margin is smaller and the positive
response of inventories is reduced relative to the regulation-free model.
Since the shock to monetary growth rate is persistent, in period 2 inflation falls. Whereas
the supply of loanable funds on behalf of the government is still low, equilibrium in the market
for funds is now attained mainly through the drop in prices, even to the extent that, in real
terms, lending increases in period 2. Through the household’s consumption Euler equation,
consumption and therefore sales rise in period 2. Afterwards, as the effect of the money shock
dies out, consumption reverts to the initial state. Because of the price adjustment, now markups
are small relative to tomorrow’s, which leads firms to decrease the stock of inventories relative
to sales. Note how, because of the ceiling, the liquidity effect in the regulation-Q model is
quite persistent. This additional gradual decline in borrowing costs further raises next period’s
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markup relative to today’s, and therefore the inventories/sales ratio is reduced more in the
regulation-Q model. As markups and sales stabilize, inventory levels return to the initial state.
The model response to a contractionary monetary shock is qualitatively consistent with
the consensus view: Interest rates rise; aggregate output, employment, the price level and
monetary aggregates fall. Admittedly, the model is too simple to replicate the precise timing
and persistence encountered in the data. Nevertheless, it provides several clear predictions about
the impact of deposit rate ceilings after a contractionary monetary shock. First and foremost,
the drop in aggregate output is more pronounced with a binding regulatory ceiling. But to
assess whether a stronger output response after a monetary tightening can be explained by the
presence of regulation Q, the following additional facts should be observed in the data: With a
binding ceiling,
1 the spread between market rates and the regulatory ceilings widens;
2. the response of real deposit holdings displays a disintermediation effect;
3. the liquidity effect, i.e. the negative effect of monetary aggregates on interest rates, is
stronger;
4. the contraction in real lending is more severe;
5. inventories/sales ratios are lower relative to the unconstrained case.
If the data support these facts, then there is evidence for a role of ceiling regulations in the
monetary transmission mechanism and in shaping the macroeconomic outcomes of the 1960s
and 1970s in the US.
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4 Confronting the Theory with the Data
To evaluate the theoretical predictions empirically, I estimate impulse responses to an identified
monetary policy innovation in a structural Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR). The objective is
to compare the impulse responses for two separate situations: One in which deposit rate ceilings
are binding, the other in which they are not. Implicitly, this means that the autoregressive
coefficients in the VAR must display time variation. The presence of time-varying coefficients
generally complicates the estimation process because of the large number of coefficients to be
estimated relative to a limited number of observations, and because of the need to define a law
of motion for the coefficients. Researchers focussing on time variation in monetary VARs have
traditionally relied either on subsample analysis (see for instance Bernanke and Mihov (1998)
and Boivin and Giannoni (2006)) or on Bayesian estimation of more sophisticated econometric
models (see Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Sims and Zha (2006)). Instead, the empirical strategy
adopted in this paper is to exploit information about the presumed source of time variation.
The assumption is that the observations on the interest-rate ceiling spreads contain sufficient
information to capture, in an asymmetric fashion, the impact of binding deposit rate ceilings.
The structural economic model underlying the time-varying VAR contains only few additional
parameters relative to a stable VAR, such that estimation is straightforward.
4.1 Empirical Model and Estimation Strategy
Model Specification - Let yt be a (n × 1) vector of time series including a price index
PIt; a commodity price index Pcomt; a measure of economic activity Yt; the federal funds rate
FFt; and a monetary aggregateMZMt, all of which are variables that are commonly included in
monetary VARs. In this paper, yt also contains some additional variables of interest, namely the
real volume of managed liabilitiesMLt; the real volume of loans LNSt; and the inventories/sales
ratio Int, such that n = 8 and yt = [Pcomt FFt PIt Yt Int MZMt LNSt MLt]′. Let
xt = [1 y′t−1 ... y′t−p]′ be a ((np+1)×1) vector containing a constant and the lagged observations,
where p denotes the number of lags. Because I use monthly data, p = 12 in all the estimations.
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Let St be the period t observation of the spread between the market interest rate and the legal
deposit rate ceiling and let S¯t ≡ max(St, 0), i.e. S¯t equals the value of the spread whenever that
value is positive, and zero otherwise. Let st = [St−1 ... St−p]′ be a (p× 1) vector of the current
and lagged observations of the spread and correspondingly, s¯t = [S¯t−1 ... S¯t−p]′ . The dynamics
of yt and St are assumed to be captured by
Ayt + CS¯t = Bxt +Ds¯t +Σ²t , (13a)
Asyt + St = Bsxt +Dsst + σs²st . (13b)
The model coefficients are contained in the matrices A(n×n), B(n×(np+1)), C(n×1), D(n×p), As(1×n),
Bs(1×(np+1)), Ds(1×p), a positive definite, diagonal matrix Σ(n×n) and the scalar σs > 0. I further
assume that A and A − CAs are invertible matrices and, without loss of generality, that the
structural shocks ²t are i.i.d. ∼ N (0, In) and ²t is i.i.d. ∼ N(0, 1). In other words, I include the
variables S¯t and s¯t into an otherwise standard structural model with the purpose of capturing
the nonlinear effects of disintermediation.
Equation (13a) can be reformulated as a VAR with time-varying coefficients. To see this,
substitute (13b) into (13a) and, for simplicity, also define Sˆt = Bsxt + Dsst + σs²st . Then
equation (13a) is equivalent to
(VAR1): yt = Gtxt + Fts¯t − ItCSˆt + ut ,
where Gt = (A− ItCAs)−1B, Ft = (A− ItCAs)−1D and where It is a dummy variable that
takes on the value of 1 if regulation Q is binding in period t. The relationship between the fun-
damental shocks and the VAR-disturbances is given by (A− ItCAs)ut = Σ²t. For comparison,
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define two further models nested by the specification VAR1:
(VAR2): C = 0 ,D = 0, yt = Gxt + ut ,
G = A−1B , Aut = Σ²t ,
(VAR3): C = 0 , yt = Gxt + F s¯t + ut ,
G = A−1B ,F = A−1D ,Aut = Σ²t .
Specification VAR2 assumes C = 0, D = 0, and corresponds therefore to the standard time-
invariant monetary VAR widely used in the literature. Assuming onlyD = 0, VAR3 corresponds
to the standard VAR in which the elements of s¯t are added as extra explanatory variables.
Identification - Recovering the structural parameters of VAR1-VAR3 is impossible without
additional identification assumptions. In correspondence with a large part of the literature on
monetary VARs, I base the strategy for estimating the effects of a monetary shock on the
recursiveness assumption, together with the assumption that the federal funds rate is a good
measure of monetary policy. Bernanke and Mihov (1998) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (1999) provide arguments why this strategy is reasonable. Suppose that the monetary
policy is characterized by the rule
FFt = f(Ωt) + ²mt , (14)
where f(·) is a linear function and Ωt is the information set of the monetary authority. A
monetary shock, denoted by ²mt , is a shock orthogonal to the elements of Ωt. The information
set Ωt contains the current value of the spread St and the commodity price index Pcomt, as well
as all of the lagged values contained in xt and st. Given the use of monthly data, this definition of
a monetary shock therefore reasonably assumes that the Federal Reserve has within-month data
on commodity prices, which are set in auction markets, and market interest rates. The Federal
Reserve does however not see current values of output, the price level, the money stock or any
of the other variables in yt. The recursiveness assumption is not sufficient for identification and,
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following common practice, I further assume that A is a lower triangular matrix with diagonal
elements equal to one. In practice, this implies that the coefficients in VAR2 and VAR3 can be
obtained by standard OLS and subsequent Choleski decomposition of the estimated variance-
covariance matrix. For standard cases as VAR2 and VAR3, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(1999) show that the additional assumptions imposed by the lower triangularity of A is without
consequence for the estimated impulse response to a monetary shock.
Estimation of VAR1 requires some more restrictions, since As and Sˆt are unknown. First,
I assume that Yt, PIt, Pcomt and Int are predetermined relative to ²st , which implies that the
corresponding elements of C are zero. In other words, a financial market shock to St does not
affect output, prices, inventories and sales within the same month. Second, I assume that there
is no contemporaneous relation between St on the one hand and Yt, PIt, Pcomt and Int on the
other hand, which implies that the corresponding elements of As are zero. Note, however, that
shocks to Pcomt still affect St within the same period indirectly through the effect on FFt.
Estimation Procedure - With the above identification scheme, VAR1 can be estimated in
the following two steps:
1. Obtain estimates of As and Sˆt by instrumental variables estimation of equation (13b),
using Yt, PIt, Pcomt and Int as instruments;
2. Use these to estimate the coefficients in A, B, C, D and Σ with conventional maximum
likelihood techniques.
Because only 4 additional coefficients need to be estimated in the VAR1 specification relative
to the stable version in VAR3, the ML-step never proved problematic. Note that in the VAR1
model, the lower triangularity assumption does matter for the impulse response to a monetary
shock. Fortunately, changing the ordering of the variables in yt led only to small changes in
the estimated impulse response functions in practice, which suggest that the results are at least
invariant to this subset of identification restrictions.
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4.2 Data and Sample
Data Series - The series included in yt are log PCEPI less food and energy for PIt; the log
index of sensitive materials prices for Pcomt; the log of interpolated real GDP for Yt; the effective
federal funds rate for FFt; the log of money at zero maturity for MZMt; the log ratio of real
inventories to real sales in trade and manufacturing for Int; the log of commercial and industrial
loans, deflated by the price index, for LNSt and the log of the volume of managed liabilities,
deflated by the price index, for MLt.4 The series used for St is the spread between the average
of the 3 and 6 month T-bill rates and the regulatory ceiling on time deposits with maturity
between 3 and 6 months.
The choice of variables is motivated by a number of considerations. Pcomt is usually included
in VARs to mitigate the so-called “price puzzle”, the finding that prices rise persistently after
a contractionary monetary shock. Real GDP constitutes the broadest measure of economic
activity. I repeated the estimations with the log index of industrial production, which is available
at monthly frequency, but obtained very similar results. Money zero maturity is the preferred
money stock measure because of its stability, because it does not include any of the components of
MLt, and because it is a good data equivalent ofQt/Pt in the theoretical model.5 I use C&I loans
rather than total bank loans, since business loans are the more appropriate measure in testing
for a credit channel affecting production. Moreover, recent research by Denhaan, Sumner and
Yamashiro (2005) stresses the importance of distinguishing between the components of banks’
loan portfolios. Finally, MLt is a good data equivalent of real deposit holdings (Mt−Qt)/Pt in
the theoretical model.
An issue in VAR estimation is whether or not to remove time trends. The inventory to
sales ratio displays a clear low frequency shift, most likely due to changes in management
techniques during the early 1980s. Also, innovations in financial markets have caused much
higher trend growth in the series for managed liabilities before 1980s than afterwards. Since
4Detailed descriptions and the sources of all series can be found in the data Appendix C.2.
5Money zero maturity (MZM) roughly equalsM2 but excludes small time deposits. See Teles and Zhou (2005)
for evidence on the stability of the MZM measure.
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these low frequency movements are outside the scope of this paper, they are removed from the
MLt and Int series with a HP filter. The smoothing parameter is 86,400, as opposed to the
conventional choice of 14,400, such as not to remove too much business cycle variation. Finally,
note that using alternative measures of the spread St did not significantly change the results.
Sample - The monthly data set covers the period 1959:1-2004:4, spanning a period of about
45 years and containing a total of 544 observations for each series in yt. However, the esti-
mation of the VAR is conducted using only a subset of the available data points, including
the periods 1960:1-1978:6 and 1983:10 to 2004:4. This means that 63 observations (1978:7 to
1983:9) are dropped during the estimations.6 Also note that in the estimation of equation in
(13b), necessarily only the first subsample is used. There are 121 data points for which the
spread is positive. The omission of a range of intermediate observations is motivated by two
considerations. First, the break date of June 1978 marks the permission of retail money market
certificates MMCs. As explained in Appendix A, these and other subsequent new instruments
offered market-determined interest rates and greatly facilitated the ability of banks to raise
funds. The second break date, October 1983, marks the elimination of the remaining ceilings
on small time deposits. The omitted data points comprise the relevant transition period during
which the effects of the regulation gradually vanished. A second reason for the omission is the
short-lived experiment of nonborrowed reserve targeting adopted by the Federal Open Market
Committee from 1979 to 1982, which resulted in excessive volatility of the federal funds rate
during this period. As shown by Bernanke and Mihov (1998) and Sims and Zha (2006), this
period constitutes a significant regime shift that invalidates the use of a single policy indicator
over the entire sample. However, Bernanke and Mihov (1998) conclude that using the funds rate
prior to 1979 and after 1982 produces reasonable results.
6These data ranges take into account the loss of observations due to the inclusion of lagged terms.
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4.3 Impulse Responses and Counterfactual Experiment
Figure 6 plots the estimated impulse response to a one-standard-deviation (0.23%) shock to the
Federal Funds rate in the VAR1 model, occurring in period t = 1. The solid line represents
the case where the deposit rate ceiling is non-binding in period 1 and all periods following the
shock, i.e. the dummy variable It takes on the value of 0 in all periods. The dashed line
represents the case where the regulation-Q constraint is binding in t = 1 and all subsequent
periods, i.e. It equals 1 in all periods. For comparison, the dotted line represents the results for
the time-invariant specification in VAR2.
According to Figure 6, the responses of the main economic aggregates to an unanticipated
monetary policy tightening are qualitatively in line with the established facts: the rise in FFt is
persistent; there is a sustained drop in Yt and, after an initial delay, also in the price level PIt;
the money stock MZMt goes down, which points to a liquidity effect. Also, in correspondence
with the theoretical model of this paper, the inventories/sales ratio rises after the shock and,
as prices start to adjust, reverts back to trend and eventually declines in the long run. At the
same time, Figure 6 reveals some important differences between the responses with and without
a binding regulation-Q constraint. A first observation is that a binding ceiling exacerbates the
output decline. Moreover, the difference in the output response is quantitatively quite large
and occurs mainly at 6 to 18 months after the shock. The extent to which this finding can
be explained by presence of the regulation Q depends on whether the other variables behave
according to the theoretical predictions of the model:
First, an unanticipated funds rate hike of 23 basis points causes the spread between the
market rate and the regulatory ceiling to widen up to 16 basis points in the third month after
the shock. Thus, the pass-through from the funds rate to the spread is considerable.
Second, without constraint, the real volume of managed liabilities MLt expands relative to
trend, peaking 9 months after the shock. With binding deposit rate ceilings, MLt declines until
6 months after the shock, after which there is a reversion back to trend. In the longer run, the
real volume of managed liabilities drops in both cases. The difference during the first year after
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the shock constitutes evidence that a money tightening induces a disintermediation effect and
is consistent with the second theoretical prediction.
Third, the negative response of money holdings MZMt is much less pronounced with bind-
ing regulation than without. In the former case, the drop in MZMt is also more short-lived,
occurring mostly during the first year after the shock. To some extent, this is because the FFt
increase is somewhat less persistent with binding regulation. Nevertheless, the results are in
line with the conjecture that the binding regulatory ceilings significantly disrupt the relation
between money demand and interest rates. It is therefore also consistent with the third theoret-
ical prediction, that negative monetary shocks are associated with a larger liquidity effect under
regulation Q.
Fourth, although real lending to firms increases immediately after the shock, before declining
in the longer run, the initial increase is much more short-lived with a binding ceiling.7 Moreover,
the contraction in real lending in the longer run is much more pronounced. In general, it is very
hard to draw firm conclusions about the direction of casuality between lending and economic
activity from this type of evidence. Some researchers, such as Romer and Romer (1990), see
the lack of a drop in lending that precedes the decline in output as evidence against a causal
role for bank credit. However, the fact that business lending, at least initially, expands after a
monetary shock can be explained by the desire of firms to finance an inventory build-up and
smooth production. What is more important to the argument of this paper is the difference
between the responses with and without binding regulation, for which the theory provides a
rationale. The evidence is therefore seen as consistent with the fourth theoretical prediction,
that the reduction in firm lending after a monetary tightening is more severe when the regulatory
constraint is binding.
Fifth, the response of the inventories/sales ratio in the first few months after the shock is
initially slightly negative with a binding ceiling and remains below the regulation-free response
for several months. This is in line with the theory, according to which firms postpone production
7The finding of an initial increase in business lending is consistent with previous results in the literature (see
for instance Denhaan, Sumner and Yamashiro (2005)).
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to a greater extent because larger increases in borrowing cost negatively affect current profit
margins. But admittedly, the difference is quantitatively rather small. Moreover, it seems as if
the inventory build-up lasts longer with the regulation-Q constraint, which seems more at odds
with the theory.8 One possible explanation is that technological improvements in inventory
management since the early 1980s influence the results for the non-binding case. A second
contributing factor potentially lies in the reaction of the price level. Without the ceiling, the
price level starts to adjust downwards after about 12 months after the shock. In contrast, the
fall in prices occurs much later with the binding constraint, after about 24 months. To the
extent that the price response implies a faster adjustment of markups in the non-binding case,
this could be reflected in a swifter adjustment of inventories.
Overall, at least four of the five theoretical predictions find support in the data. The evidence
thus seems broadly consistent with an economically significant role of the disintermediation effect
in the monetary transmission mechanism during the 1960s and 1970s. Whether the difference
in the responses with and without binding deposit rate ceiling are also statistically significant
can be further examined by testing whether the coefficients contained in C, D are significantly
different from zero. Table 2 presents the asymptotic likelihood ratio test statistics. The results
in the first row compare the unrestricted, time varying-coefficients model to the standard stable
monetary VAR. The null hypothesis, that C = 0 and D = 0 is strongly rejected by the data. A
second and third hypothesis, that only the coefficients of C, resp. D are zero, are also firmly
rejected.
To gain some further insight in the role of the regulation-induced disintermediation effect,
Figure 7 examines the response to an identified one-standard-deviation positive shock to the
interest rate-ceiling spread. The rise in the spread causes an immediate decline in managed lia-
bilities MLt, reflecting substitution out of time deposits. Interestingly, this decline is associated
with a relatively quick drop in real lending to firms. This observation constitutes additional
evidence that the disintermediation effect negatively affected the ability of banks to lend during
8This is in line with McCarthy and Zakrajsek (2003) who find, using subsample analysis, a smoother and
shorter-lived response of inventories/sales ratios after a contractionary monetary shock in recent samples.
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the 1960s and 1970s. The response of output displays a swift and fairly persistent decline shortly
after the shock. There is also a short-run decrease in the inventories/sales ratio. More so than
for the monetary shock, the inventories response to a spread shock is in line with the hypothesis
that firms postpone production because increases in borrowing cost negatively affect current
profit margins. In any case, the evidence points to considerable real effects of a spread shock
in accordance with a channel of transmission operating through bank lending. Note, how the
money stock increases immediately after the shock. This potentially reflects a reaction of the
Federal Reserve to counteract the negative spread shock by a money supply expansion. There
is a slight increase in the price level, and no clear pattern in the response of the Federal Funds
rate, which could be consistent with this conjecture.
Given that the above results suggest a considerable degree of time variation in the AR
coefficients of the VAR, it is informative to make a comparison with the results from the stan-
dard VAR2 specification with stable coefficients. An interesting question is how the failure to
explicitly take into account the regulation-induced disintermediation effects of the 1960s and
1970s biases the estimated responses in the basic VAR. In other words, to what extent does the
omission distort our understanding of the effects of a monetary shock in more recent samples?
Perhaps the most obvious observation concerns the behavior of monetary aggregates. For one,
the VAR2 specification tends to underestimate both the short and long-run interest elasticity
of money demand. The fundamentally different response of MLt also makes evident why the
MZM money definition, which roughly corresponds to M2 excluding small time deposits, is a
more useful measure of the money stock as a macroeconomic indicator. In addition, not taking
into account the disintermediation effect leads to overestimation of the contractionary effect on
output of a monetary tightening. Another issue concerns the measurement of the monetary pol-
icy innovations. Figure 8 reports the 3-month centered, equally-weighted moving average of the
estimated shocks for the VAR1 and VAR2 models. Several researchers, such as Boivin and Gi-
annoni (2002), have found monetary policy shocks to be significantly more volatile in the 1960s
and 1970s than after the mid 1980s. Table 3 reports the standard deviations of the estimated
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policy shocks for the periods 1960:1-1978:6 and 1983:10-2004:4. For the VAR2 specification, the
shocks are indeed found to be about 30% more volatile in the earlier sample. In contrast, the
volatilities in the two subsamples are virtually identical in the VAR1 model.
Business Cycle Volatility: A Counterfactual Experiment - This section returns to
the bigger question, to what extent has the disintermediation effect contributed to business cycle
volatility during the 1960s and 1970s? The answer involves estimating how the economy would
have evolved, had the regulation Q not been in place. I perform a counterfactual experiment
using the estimated VAR1 model. The structural shocks obtained from the data are fed into the
VAR system, but with the dummy variable It equal to zero in every period. This implies that the
spread no longer plays any role for the dynamics of yt. Figure 9 reports the true and simulated
HP-filtered paths of real GDP for the 1960:1-1978:6 sample period.9 The figure shows how all
three of the NBER-dated recessions would have been considerably milder. The regulation Q
effect seems to be the weakest for the 1960 recession. In contrast, the experiment suggests that
1970 recession would not even have occurred without regulation Q in place. Recall from Section
2 that positive market rate-ceiling spreads caused a severe contraction in the volume of large
time deposits towards the start of the 1969-1970 recession, which eventually led to the removal of
certain ceilings while the recession was already well under way. This intervention suggests that
policymakers at the time indeed considered disintermediation to be an important contributing
factor. Also the 1973-1975 recession would have been considerably less severe without regulation
Q in place. By and large, most of the differences between the true and simulated series occur
during the 1970s. This is primarily because, in contrast to the early 1960, the continuous upward
revisions of the ceilings were much less sufficient to keep pace with rising market interest rates
in that period. Table 4 reports the standard deviation of HP-filtered real GDP. In accordance
with the evidence on the Great Moderation, output volatility in the data is about twice as large
in the 1960:1-1978:6 than in the 1983:10-2004:4 sample. Removing the effect of the regulation-Q
ceilings, the output volatility in the 1960:1-1978:6 sample drops from 1.17% in the data to 0.77%
9The HP-filter employs a smoothing parameter of 14,400.
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in the counterfactual experiment. In other words, the experiment suggests that more than two
thirds of the reduction in the Great Moderation can be explained by removing the effects of
deposit rate ceilings in the data.
5 Conclusion
Assessing the role of changes in the monetary transmission mechanism is essential for understand-
ing the performance of the US economy since the mid 1980s. This paper has provided evidence
for a disintermediation phenomenon in the 1960s and 1970s that is linked to the existence of
deposit rate ceilings under regulation Q. In a monetary DSGE model that incorporates interest
rate ceilings as occasionally binding constraints, I showed how a binding constraint changes the
behavior of monetary aggregates and aggravates the output decline after a monetary tighten-
ing primarily through a credit channel. In addition, I argued that the main predictions of the
model are supported in the data by estimating a time-varying coefficients VAR that captures
the nonlinearities implied by binding regulation.
In the debate on the stability of monetary VARs, my empirical results suggest a significant
amount of time variation in the autoregressive coefficients that is due to changes in the financial
landscape, and to regulation-induced disintermediation effects in particular. Regarding the
causes of the Great Moderation, my counterfactual experiment indicates that two thirds of the
reduction in output volatility can be explained by the removal of deposit rate ceilings in the
early 1980s. Even if this number seems large, it does suggest that financial markets deregulation
and innovation deserve more attention in future research as an explanation for the outstanding
performance of the US economy over the last couple of decades.
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A Appendix: A Brief History of Regulation Q
Until the second half of the 1950s, regulation Q was of limited significance in US banking, as the
legal ceilings remained well above market rates and the average rates paid on savings and term
deposits. However, the gradual rise of interest rates in the 1950s made the ceilings bind for the
first time since their inception. In order to provide banks with greater flexibility in competing
for funds, in 1957 legislators decided to raise the ceilings for the first time in over 20 years.
Nevertheless, the continuing updrift in market rates throughout the 1960s and 1970s meant
banks were frequently unable to offer competitive yields. The recurrent problems in the banking
sector stirred reactions by both regulators and banks: On the one hand the maximum rates
payable on various types of deposits were frequently revised; on the other hand, banks actively
sought to decrease their reliance on heavily regulated sources of funds through innovation.
The rising interest rates necessitated frequent adjustments of the ceilings. As an illustration,
Figure 10 depicts the ceiling on savings deposits at commercial banks, together with the interest
rate on 3-month Treasury bills. The figure shows how the maximum rate payable was revised
upwards on multiple occasions: To 3.5% in 1962, 4% in 1964, 4.5% in 1970, 5% in 1973, 5.25%
in 1979 and finally to 5.5% in 1984. Similar revisions were made for the other deposit categories.
But despite all these adjustments, market rates repeatedly rose above the ceilings. Quarterly
surveys conducted by the Federal Home Lone Bank Board during the 1970s confirm that the
vast majority of banks were indeed paying the maximum rates.10 One major regulatory change
occurred during the recession of 1970, when ceilings on certain types of large time deposits were
suspended. The suspension took place after the volume outstanding of these instruments had
shrunk dramatically because ceilings had hampered banks to compete effectively. Later, in May
1973, all large denomination time deposits were freed of interest rate restrictions. Towards the
end of the 1970s, the regulatory attitude started to move more in pace with developments in
the financial markets. Finally, the Monetary Control Act (MCA) of 1980 initiated the phaseout
of regulation Q. In practice, the remaining ceilings on small term deposits were eliminated in
10See Cook (1978) for a discussion of the survey results.
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October 1983, and those on savings deposits in March 1986.
After the experience of the late 1950s, depository institutions started to reduce their reliance
on heavily regulated sources of funds. The binding ceilings unleashed a cat-and-mouse game
between banks and regulators: Banks would develop a new instrument, after which the Federal
Reserve would declare it a deposit and subject it to regulation Q. Before 1960, almost all
deposits at US banks consisted of demand and savings deposits. Figure 11, which plots the
ratio of managed liabilities to core deposits, shows the shift in deposit categories throughout the
1960s and 1970s. One of the key innovations in this respect was the creation in 1961 of large
denomination negotiable CDs by a New York bank, together with the creation of a secondary
market. The advantage of the negotiable CD was that it was a liquid, interest-bearing asset
that was marketable when nearing maturity. This contrasted with standard time deposits which
could not bear interest at maturities below 30 days. Within a couple of years, total domestic
negotiable CDs outstanding had risen dramatically. Another innovation were the Eurodollar
deposits, which, falling outside of the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve, were not subject to
regulatory ceilings. After interest rates had risen well above the maximum rates during the
1973-1975 recession, banks put strong pressure on legislators for deregulation. In June 1978,
the use of retail money market certificates (MMCs), a new category of 6-month time deposits
was permitted. The ceiling rate on newly issued MMCs was adjusted weekly to the current
discount yield on 6-month T-bills and then remained constant until maturity. Similarly, 1979
saw the introduction of small saver certificates (SSCs), which had large maturities but also paid
market-determined interest rates. The subsequent growth in the use of MMCs and SSCs, which
were effectively ridden of interest rate ceilings, greatly improved the ability of banks to compete
with money market instruments from 1978 onwards. In fact, Gilbert and Lovati (1979) observe
how the authorization of MMCs by Federal regulators arose precisely in an attempt to reduce
the extent of disintermediation.
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B Theoretical Appendix
Attention is confined to symmetric equilibria in which Pjt = Pt, Njt = Nt, yjt = yt, hjt = ht
and sjt = st for all j ∈ (0, 1). In addition, the state space is confined to yield equilibria where
all net nominal interest rates are positive, and it is verified that the inequality in (4) never
binds. Although the method used to solve the model allows to take into account the zero bound
on nominal interest rates as well as the inequality in (4), both are irrelevant for the choice of
parameters discussed in Section 3.2 and are therefore ignored in the equilibrium definition below.
It is useful to scale the model’s nominal quantities by the beginning-of-period money stock
and define [pt qt wt] ≡ [Pt Qt Wt]/Mt. In addition, let zt be the inverse markup due to imperfect
competition in the goods markets. An equilibrium is conveniently defined as a set of sequences
of quantities {yt, ht, ct, nt, qt}∞t=0 and prices {pt, rt, Rt, zt, wt}∞t=0 such that in every period t and
given the initial conditions p0, n0 − c0 and the period t history of realizations of χt, the system
of equations, given by (A.1)-(A.11) is satisfied.
Household
Ψht =
1
ct
wt
pt
(A.1)
1 = βEt
[
ct
ct+1
Rt+1
pt
pt+1µt
]
(A.2)
Rt = 1 + Ω
(
qt
pt
)− 1φ
ct (A.3)
Policy
Rt = min(rt, Rq) (A.4)
ln(µt) = (1− ρ) ln(µ)
+ρ ln(µt−1) + χt (A.5)
Firms
yt = hαt − θ (A.6)
nt = yt + nt−1 − ct−1 (A.7)
wt
pt
= α
zt
rt
yt + θ
ht
(A.8)
1 =
²
²− 1Etβ
[
ct+1
ct+2
zt+2
]
(A.9)(
ξ
ct
nt
− zt
)
= βEt
[
ct
ct+1
zt+1
](
ξ
ct
nt
− 1
)
(A.10)
Loan Market
qt = µt − wtht (A.11)
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The first set of equilibrium conditions summarizes the household’s optimal behavior. Equa-
tion (A.1) determines labor supply by equating the marginal disutility of working to the real
wage, weighted by the marginal utility of consumption 1/ct. The household’s saving and con-
sumption behavior is governed by the standard Euler condition, given by equation (A.2). Equa-
tion (A.3) specifies the demand for cash.
Equation (A.4) stipulates the regulation-Q restriction on the deposit rate and (A.5) specifies
monetary policy.
Equation (A.6) specifies the production technology and (A.7) states that the current aggregate
stock of final consumption goods available for sale equals the sum of newly produced goods and
inventories carried over from the previous period. Labor demand is determined by equating the
real wage with the marginal product of labor, as in (A.8). Equation (A.9) determines the typical
firm’s optimal price-setting behavior, with prices set as markups over expected discounted future
marginal costs. Similar to Jung and Yun (2006), the possibility of inventory investment leads
firms to take into account marginal cost two periods ahead rather than one. Finally, equation
(A.10) dictates the firms’ optimal inventory accumulation and is identical to the first-order con-
dition of inventory investment in the partial equilibrium setting of Bils and Kahn (2000).
Finally, clearing in the market for loans requires that the nominal wage bill equals the total
volume of loanable funds, as in equation (A.11).
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C Data Appendix
C.1 Data used in Figures 1-4 and 10-11
The data on the ceiling rates on the various types of deposits was constructed from the Annual
Statistical Digest published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The
monthly time series are available from the author. Market interest rates are from Federal Re-
serve release H.15: Selected Interest Rates. The seasonally adjusted data on deposits is from
Federal Reserve release H.6: Money Stock Measures. The following series were used to construct
Figures 1-4.
Figure 1: Annualized growth in managed liabilities is the year-on-year growth in the sum of
small and large time deposits, repurchase agreements and eurodollar deposits at all depository
institutions, deflated by the Personal Consumption Expenditures price index; annualized growth
in core deposits is year-on-year growth in savings and checkable deposits at all depository insti-
tutions in the US, deflated by the Personal Consumption Expenditures price index.
Figure 2: Spread is the difference between the 3-month Treasury Bill rate and the ceiling on
savings deposits at commercial banks with maturity less than 12 months; annualized growth in
core deposits is year-on-year growth in savings and checkable deposits at all depository institu-
tions in the US, deflated by the Personal Consumption Expenditures price index. Core deposits
include Money Market Deposit Accounts.
Figure 3: Components of managed liabilities are small time deposits, large time deposits, re-
purchase agreements and eurodollar deposits at all depository institutions, each divided by the
sum of small and large time deposits, repurchase agreements and eurodollar deposits at all de-
pository institutions.
Figure 4: Annualized growth in small term deposits is year-on-year growth in small term de-
posits (STDs) at all depository institutions, deflated by the Personal Consumption Expenditures
price index; Spreads are the differences between 1) 3-month T-bill and ceiling on STDs with
maturity from 30 to 89 days, 2) average of 3-month and 6 month T-bill rate and the ceiling on
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STDs from 90 to 179 days, 3) average of 6-month T-bill rate and 1 year T-security rate and
the ceiling on STDs from 180 days to 1 year, 4) average of 1-year and 2-year T-security rate
and the ceiling on STDs from 1 year to 2 years. Annualized growth in large term deposits is
year-on-year growth in large term deposits (LTDs) at all depository institutions, deflated by
the Personal Consumption Expenditures price index. Spreads are the differences between 1)
3-month T-bill rate and ceiling on LTDs with maturity from 30 to 59 days, 2) 3-month T-bill
rate and the ceiling on LTDs from 60 to 89 days, 3) average of 3-month and 6-month T-bill
rate and the ceiling on LTDs from 90 to 179 days, 4) average of 6-month T-bill rate and 1-year
T-security rate and the ceiling on LTDs from 180 days to 1 year.
Figure 10: Ceiling on savings deposits at commercial banks with maturity less than 12 months;
3-Month Treasury Bill rate (secondary market).
Figure 11: The ratio of managed liabilities is the sum of small and large time deposits, repur-
chase agreements and eurodollar deposits at all depository institutions divided by the sum of
savings and checkable deposits at all depository institutions.
C.2 Additional Data used in VARs
Price Index: Personal Consumption Expenditures Chain-Type Price Index Less Food and En-
ergy, Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis, http://research.stlouisfed.org/
Commodity Price Index: Index of Sensitive Materials Prices, Business Cycle Indicators,
The Conference Board Series, http://www.conference-board.org
Real GDP: Real Gross Domestic Product, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, U.S. Department
of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis (NIPA), http://www.bea.gov/
Inventories/Sales Ratio: Ratio of Manufacturing and Trade Inventories (Chained 2000 $) to
Manufacturing and Trade Sales (Chained 2000 $), Business Cycle Indicators, The Conference
Board Series, (mnemonics A0M070 and A0M057) http://www.conference-board.org
Federal Funds Rate: Effective Federal Funds Rate, The Federal Reserve System’s H.15 re-
lease, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15.
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Commercial and Industrial Loans: Commercial and Industrial Loans at All Commercial
Banks, H.8 Statistical Release of the Federal Reserve System,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8.
References
Ahmed S., Levine A. and Wilson B.A., 2004, Recent US Macroeconomic Stability: Good Policies, Good
Practices, or Good Luck?, The Review of Economics and Statistics 86(3), 824–832.
Bernanke B.S. and Mihov I., 1998, Measuring Monetary Policy, The Quarterly Journal of Economics
113(3), 869–902.
Bils M., and Kahn J.A., 2000, What Inventory Behavior Tells Us about Business Cycles, American
Economic Review 90(3), 458–481.
Blanchard O.J. and Simon, J.A., 2001, The Long and Large Decline in US Output Volatility, Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1, 135–164.
Boivin J. and Giannoni M., 2002, Assessing the Changes in The Monetary Transmission Mechanism: A
VAR Approach, FRBNY Economic Policy Review 8, 97–111.
Boivin J. and Giannoni M., 2006, Has Monetary Policy Become More Effective?, The Review of Economic
Statistics, (forthcoming).
Carrol C.D, 2006, The Method of Endogenous Gridpoints for Solving Dynamic Stochastic Optimization
Problems, Economics Letters 91(3), 312-320
Chari V.V., Kehoe P.J. and McGrattan E.R., 2000, Sticky Price Models of the Business Cycle: Can the
Contract Multiplier Solve the Persistence Problem?, Econometrica 68(5), 1151–1180.
Christiano L.J., 1988, Why Does Inventory Investment Fluctuate So Much?, Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 21(2-3), 247–280.
Christiano L.J. and Eichenbaum M., 1992, Liquidity Effects and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism,
American Economic Review 82(2), 346–353
Christiano L.J. and Eichenbaum M., 2005, Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to
Monetary Policy, Journal of Political Economy 113(1),1–45.
Christiano L.J., Eichenbaum M. and Evans C.L., 1998, Modeling Money, NBER Working Paper 6371
Christiano L.J., Eichenbaum M. and Evans C.L., 1999, Monetary Policy Shocks: What Have We Learned
and to What End?, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.) Handbook of Macroeconomics, North
Holland, chapter 2, 65–148.
Clarida R.J., Gali J. and Gertler M., 2000, Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence
and Some Theory, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(1), 147–180.
37
Cogley T. and Sargent T.J, 2001, Evolving Post-World War II US Inflation Dynamics, in: B.S. Bernanke
and K. Rogoff (ed.) NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 331–373.
Cogley T. and Sargent T.J, 2005, Drifts and Volatilities: Monetary Policies and Outcomes in the Post
WWII US, Review of Economic Dynamics 8(2), 262–302.
Coleman W.J. II, 1990, Solving the Stochastic Growth Model by Policy Function Iteration, Journal of
Business and Economic Statistics, 8(1), 27–29
Cook T.Q., 1978, Regulation Q and the Behavior of Savings and Small Time Deposits at Commer-
cial Banks and Thrift Institutions, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Review Novem-
ber/December 1978, 14–28.
Denhaan W.J., Sumner S.W. and Yamashiro G., 2005, Banks’ Loan Porfolio and the Monetary Trans-
mission Mechanism, unpublished manuscript.
Duca J., 1996, Deposit Deregulation and the Sensitivity of Housing, Jounal of Housing Economics 5(3),
207–226.
Duca J., 2005, The Bank Consumer Credit Channel and Consumption, unpublished manuscript.
Dynan K.E., Douglas D.W. and Sichel D.E., 2006, Can Financial Innovation Help to Explain the Reduced
Volatility of Economic Activity?, Jounal of Monetary Economics 53(1), 123-150.
Fuerst, 1992, Liquidity, Loanable Funds, and Real Activity, Journal of Monetary Economics 29(1), 3–24.
Gilbert R.A., and Lovati J.M., 1979, Disintermediation: An Old Disorder With a New Remedy, Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review Januari 1979, 10-15.
Judd K.J., 1998, Numerical Methods in Economics, The MIT Press
Jung Y., and Yun T., 2006, Monetary Policy Shocks, Inventory Dynamics, and Price-Setting Behavior,
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper Series 2006-02.
Kahn J.A., McConnell M. and Perez-Quiros G., 2002, On the Causes of the Increased Stability of the US
Economy, FRBNY Economic Policy Review 8, 183–202.
Kim C.J. and Nelson C.R., 1999, Has the US Economy Become More Stable? A Bayesian Approach
Based on a Markov-Switching Model of the Business Cycle, The Review of Economic Statistics 81(4),
608–616.
Kydland F.E., and Prescott E.C., 1982, Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations, Econometrica 50(6),
1345–1370.
Lucas R.E., 1988, Money Demand in the United States: A Quantitative Review, Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy 29, 137–167.
McCarthy J. and Peach R.W., 2002, Monetary Policy Transmission to Residential Investment, FRBNY
Economic Policy Review 8, 139–158.
McCarthy J. and Zakrajsek E., 2003, Inventory Dynamics and Business Cycles: What has Changed?,
Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2003-26 .
McConnell M. and Perez-Quiros G., 2000, Output Fluctuations in the United States: What Has Changed
since the Early 1980s?, American Economic Review 90(5), 1464–1476.
38
Ramey V.A. and Vine D.J., 2005, Tracking the Source of the Decline in GDP Volatility: An Analysis
of the Automobile Industry, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Finance and Economics Discussion
Series 2005-14.
Romer C.D. and Romer D.H., 1990, New Evidence on the Monetary Transmission Mechanism, Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1, 149–198.
Rotemberg J.J. and Woodford M., 1995. Dynamic General Equilibrium Models with Imperfectly Compet-
itive Product Markets, in: T. Cooley (ed.) Frontiers of Business Cycle Research, Princeton University
Press.
Rendahl P., 2006, Inequality Constraints in Recursive Economies, EUI Working Paper 2006/6.
Ruebling C.E., 1970, The Adminstration of Regulation Q, Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis February
1970 issue, 29–40.
Sims, C.A. and Zha T., 2006, Were There Regime Switches in US Monetary Policy?, American Economic
Review 96(1), 54–81
Stock J.H and Watson M.W., 2002, Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why? , in: M. Gertler and K.
Rogoff (ed.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 159–218.
Teles P. and Zhou R., 2005, A Stable Money Demand: Looking for the Right Monetary Aggregate,
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives 1st Quarter, 50–63.
39
Table 1: Parameter Values of the Theoretical Model
Household Preferences
β 1.03−0.25 Household discount factor
Ψ 0.64 Time allocation parameter
Ω 4.38e−5 Utility weight of real cash balances
φ 0.24 Interest rate elasticity of money demand
² 5.79 Price elasticity of demand for goods
ξ 0.08 Sales stock elasticity of demand for goods
Technology
α 0.64 Labor input elasticity of production
θ 0.18 Fixed cost of production
Monetary Policy
µ 1.012 Average money growth rate
ρ 0.3 Persistence of the shock
σ 0.012 Standard deviation of the shock
Table 2: Asymptotic Likelihood Ratio Tests
Unrestr. Model Restr. Model H0 Statistic Df χ2(df) P-value
VAR1 VAR2 C = 0, D = 0 463.74 100 < 0.01
VAR1 VAR3 C = 0|D 6= 0 264.21 4 < 0.01
VAR3 VAR2 D = 0|C = 0 199.53 96 < 0.01
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Figure 1: Annualized Real Growth in Core Deposits and Managed Liabilities.
Monthly data (Jan 1960-Dec 2005). Grey areas indicate NBER-dated recessions (peak-to-through).
Data: See Appendix C.1.
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Figure 2: Annualized Real Growth in Core Deposits and 3-Month Treasury Bill -
Ceiling Spread.
Monthly data (Jan 1960- Mar 1986). Grey areas indicate NBER-dated recessions (peak-to-
through). Data: See Appendix C.1.
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Figure 3: Components of Managed Liabilities.
Monthly data (Jan 1960-Dec 2005). Grey areas indicate NBER-dated recessions (peak-to-through).
Data: See Appendix C.1.
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Figure 4: Annualized Real Growth in Small and Large Time Deposits and Spreads
between the Market Rate on Treasury Securities with Similar Maturity and the De-
posit Rate Ceiling.
Monthly data (Jan 1960-Mar 1986). Grey areas indicate NBER-dated recessions (peak-to-through).
Data: See Appendix C.1.
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Figure 5: Theoretical Response to a One-St.-Dev. Negative Money Growth Shock.
The shock occurs in period 1. The solid line depicts the response without regulation Q and the
dashed line depicts the response with binding regulation Q.
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Figure 6: VAR1/VAR2 Response to a One-St.-Dev. Positive Funds Rate Shock.
The shock occurs in period 1. VAR1 is the model with time varying coefficients. VAR2 is the
standard stable monetary VAR. The solid line depicts the response without regulation Q and the
dashed line depicts the response with binding regulation Q.
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Figure 7: VAR1 Response to a One-St.-Dev. Positive Spread Shock.
The shock occurs in period 1.
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Figure 8: 3-Month Centered, Equally-Weighted Moving Average of Monetary Policy
Shock Measures.
Grey areas indicate NBER-dated recessions (peak-to-through).
Table 3: Standard Deviation of Monetary Shock
Model Sample St.Dev.
VAR1 1960:1-1978:6 0.10%
VAR1 1983:10-2004:4 0.10%
VAR2 1960:1-1978:6 0.12%
VAR2 1983:10-2004:4 0.09%
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Figure 9: Real GDP Counterfactual Experiment.
Grey areas indicate NBER-dated recessions (peak-to-through). The solid line depicts the
true data and the dashed line depicts the simulated path of real GDP for the experiment
without regulation Q.
Table 4: Standard Deviation of HP-filtered Real GDP
Series Sample St.Dev.
Data 1960:1-1978:6 1.17%
Experiment no Reg Q 1960:1-1978:6 0.77%
Data 1983:10-2004:4 0.58%
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Figure 10: 3-Month T-Bill Rate and Ceiling on Savings Deposits at Commercial
Banks.
Monthly data (Nov 1933-Dec 1989). Data: See Appendix C.1.
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Figure 11: Ratio of Managed Liabilities to Core Deposits.
Monthly data (Jan 1960-Dec 2005). Grey areas indicate NBER-dated recessions (peak-to-through).
Data: See Appendix C.1.
